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Abstract 
Standard theory of the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxation implicitly assumes that compliance is 
not influenced by the framing of the taxes. According to our findings, this is not the case. Using an 
experimental approach, we examine whether framing the tax payment decision as income tax or 
consumption tax influences compliance. We find that median compliance is 10.2 percentage points higher 
in the income tax framing. Further, we find that subjects’ reaction to a change in tax rates is comparable, 
but reaction towards a change in detection rates is higher in the consumption tax scheme. We conclude 
that behavioral patterns should be taken into account when drawing conclusions about the direct-indirect 
tax mix. 
JEL Classification: C91, H21, H24, H26 
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1.  Introduction 
The idea of a consumption-based tax system has gained ever greater attention in 
tax policy debates of recent years. In the European Union (EU), most of the ten states 
that became EU members in May 2004 rely more on a value-added tax than on a 
corporate income tax. Furthermore, these states generally have lower corporate income 
tax rates than do the old EU member states. This new tax structure within the EU has 
given rise to much competition among the old and new EU member states with regard 
to both tax rates and structure of the tax system. In Germany, for example, the Tax 
Reform Act 2008 reduced the overall corporate tax rate from about 40 to about 30 
percent. Almost at the same time, the government has raised the value-added tax rate 
from 16 to 19 percent, thereby increasing the importance of indirect taxes in the overall 
tax system. The United States Congress also is currently debating the Fair Tax Act of 
2007 (H.R.25), which is a proposal to repeal the income tax and other current federal 
taxes, such as the estate and gift tax, and implement a national sales tax instead. 
In public finance theory, the efficiency effects of a consumption tax in 
comparison to an income tax have been discussed for many years. Primary arguments 
for a general consumption tax are that it has less negative effects on labor supply than 
the income tax and that it interferes less with the choice between present and future 
consumption. A consumption tax further increases the part of the national income 
saved, and thus leads to more capital formation and higher economic growth (Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1989)). The major argument in favor of income taxation is generally that 
it is more adequate for the redistribution of income between income groups (Saez 
(2004)). 
However, the design of the optimal tax system depends not only on 
considerations about efficiency and equity, but also on fiscal administration and 
enforcement costs. In this paper we present a new insight in compliance differences 
between divergent framings of the tax payment decision. Our research is rooted in the 
notion of behavioral public finance, which implies that behavioral effects must be 
considered in a well designed tax system (McCaffery and Slemrod (2006a)). In particular,  
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we compare the tax payment decision between an income tax declaration scheme that 
has the possibility to underdeclare income and a consumption tax scheme with the 
possibility of buying a certain good either on the legal market, or on the black market 
where taxes on consumption are not levied.  
For fiscal authorities, noncompliance, both in consumption and income tax, is a 
great concern. However, experimental research on the behavioral aspects of 
noncompliance has focused on income tax evasion, as summarized for instance by Alm 
(1991) and Andreoni et al. (1998). There is still little behavioral work on noncompliance 
in other areas of taxation (Webley et al. (2006)). Given the broad utilization of indirect 
taxation by governments around the world, this discrepancy is remarkable. To our 
knowledge, our study is the first work to explicitly focus on the behavioral differences in 
noncompliance between income and consumption tax. 
In this study we develop an experimental design for the comparative analysis of 
compliance in consumption and income tax settings. The advantages of experimental 
work in the field of noncompliance are evident by the very nature of the problem of tax 
evasion, since noncompliance can only be observed with a high probability of error. 
Furthermore, our design allows us to explicitly control for the key determinants of 
compliance, namely the tax rate, detection probability, effectiveness of government 
spending, and penalty fees. It further enables us to control for omitted variables that are 
constant between the two tax framings. Hence, in our experimental design any 
differences in compliance can be attributed to a potential behavioral effect, that is, any 
combination of omitted variables inconsistent between the two tax payment framings.  
We utilize this experimental setup to identify differences in the level of 
noncompliance for an income or a consumption tax-based pay scheme when there is an 
equal effective tax burden and equal enforcement. We further analyze, whether 
compliance in both tax payment framings is influenced differently by changes in tax 
rates and tax enforcement efforts, hence the relative weight of the two tax schemes in 
the overall tax system. Thus, to the current political debate about consumption versus 
income taxes we add the important aspect of noncompliance that has not yet been 
incorporated.  
We report significantly lower compliance when the tax payment decision is 
framed as a consumption tax rather than an income tax. Even though we do not find 
different reactions towards an increase in tax rates, we do find significant differences in 
reaction towards a change in detection probabilities. Particularly we observe that 
individuals react more strongly when detection probabilities are increased in the 
consumption tax scheme than when they are increased in the income tax scheme. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section two we review noncompliance 
models and related previous work on behavioral public finance. In Section three, we 
first develop a theoretical framework that allows us to predict the theoretical behavior 
of a fully rational taxpayer. We then derive our research hypothesis, and further describe 
the details of the experimental design. We discuss our findings in Section four. In 
Section five, we conclude by discussing possible future research on the issues raised by 
our experimental results.   
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2.  Motivation and Prior Research 
2.1  Comparing Direct and Indirect Taxation 
The first researcher to discuss the problem of optimal taxation was Ramsey 
(1927). In his pioneering work, he assumes a model in which the government wants to 
raise a fixed amount of revenue merely by consumption taxation, and he analyzes the 
tax rates that should be applied to a number of different goods. He assumes that all 
goods can be taxed at different rates, which does not seem feasible in a market system 
without a social planner. His basic conclusion is that the percentage of reduction in 
demand for each good should be the same after introducing a consumption tax to the 
tax system. This model is known as the Ramsey optimum tax rule.  
Numerous other scholars have also analyzed the basic question of the usefulness 
of a consumption tax in general. Hotelling (1938) finds that because of the distortion of 
optimal consumption caused by consumption taxes, welfare provisions are maximized 
by an income tax rather than a consumption tax. The models by Lerner (1970) and Dixit 
(1970) explicitly take into account goods that cannot be taxed with a consumption tax, 
which is an implicit assumption of Ramsey (1927). The Lerner and Dixit models both 
show that in the case of a non-taxable goods sector, if taxes on certain goods are 
increased, then policy design must incorporate the possibilities of a shift of 
consumption towards the untaxed sector, and vice versa. Thus, policy makers must be 
concerned about cross-elasticity between the taxable and the non-taxable goods or 
sectors. A summary of the earlier models can be found in Sandmo (1976); a more recent 
summary appears in Slemrod (1990). However, we note that so far, none of the models 
have allowed for the possibility of tax evasion. 
The economics of crime argument, which was developed by Becker (1968), was 
introduced to noncompliance research by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). These authors 
analyze how rational individuals should react in an income tax-based system in which 
evasion is possible and compliance cannot be fully enforced by the authorities. 
In the following years, some papers analyze the question of evasion only in 
consumption taxes. Gordon (1990), Cremer and Gahvari (1993), and McLaren (1998) 
are some examples of this theme of research. The Cremer/Gahvari and McLaren 
models both investigate how a firm would react if it had the possibility to evade sales 
taxes. Both models find that this would lead to a modified Ramsey optimum tax rule. 
Gordon additionally includes the demand side for “under the counter” transactions into 
his model. He particularly analyzes the effect of a noncompliance penalty on consumers 
compared to a penalty on firms that engage in such transactions.  
More recent models incorporate a consumption tax into the economics of crime 
approach in taxation, such as Boadway et al. (1994) and Richter and Boadway (2005). 
Unfortunately, those models continue to allow for noncompliance only in income taxes, 
even though the authors explicitly model consumption taxes. The basic assumption of 
this approach is that a tax on consumption can largely be enforced, so evasion is highly 
unlikely. To the astute reader, the assumption of a full enforcement of the consumption 
tax seems a rather strong one. To our knowledge, there has never been a model that 
explicitly allowed for income and consumption tax evasion at the same time.  
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2.2   Framing in Tax Decision Making 
The issue of comparing income and consumption tax ultimately breaks down to 
a question of framing the tax payment decision. To a rational individual, only the 
expected amount of payment should matter. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) introduced 
the concept of framing into economics, which basically states that if the same problem 
is presented in two different ways, responses can be different. Also, the application of 
framing within the research of optimal taxation is not completely novel and has been 
previously utilized by, for instance, McCaffery (2000), Sausgruber (2002), and Krishna 
and Slemrod (2003). Most of the research so far evolves around the question of how 
taxpayers perceive the burden that the government has placed on them. In his 
experiments, Sausgruber (2002) finds that the mere question of who has to transfer the 
taxes to the tax authorities (the company or the consumer) leads to a significant 
difference in the perceived tax burden. When individuals do not have to transfer the 
taxes, the perception of tax burden is significantly lower, even though economic burden 
is the same. 
From a policy perspective, Krishna and Slemrod (2003) argue that policy makers 
might take into account the perception of a certain increase in taxes, and thus are 
probing for the lowest perceived burden at equal tax revenues in order to assure 
reelection. McCaffery (2000) takes this idea one step further by stating that cognitively 
favored tax systems could be more stable, and thus are more likely to survive in the long 
run. 
McCaffery and Slemrod (2006b) subsume all the above in the novel notion of 
behavioral public finance. They also provide a thorough review of the topics that are 
currently debated in this area of research. Within this area, it is generally implied that 
“form matters” when government revenues are to be levied from the taxpayers. 
Research in behavioral public finance brings forward biases that are known from 
psychology or behavioral finance in the area of public finances and thrives to discover 
biases that are yet unknown. We add to previous research by investigating how framing 
of the tax payment decision influences individual compliance. Such differences in 
compliance merely caused by differently framing the tax payment decision are of great 
important to policy makers in designing optimal tax systems. 
Despite its enormous importance for public finance, research on framing and 
noncompliance hardly exists. The first paper indicating that differences in tax 
compliance could occur conditional on the framing of the tax-payment decision is a 
working paper by Gueth and Sausgruber (2004). They design an experiment in which 
subjects vote for either a mixture of income and consumption taxes, in which the 
consumption tax is fully enforced and the income tax is not enforced at all, or an 
income tax scheme that cannot be enforced. Even though the authors are not 
particularly interested in the direct-indirect tax mix, they find that the subjects’ tax 
morale is significantly higher in the latter scheme. Regrettably, the Gueth and 
Sausgruber (2004) experiments do not allow for direct comparison between the two 
schemes. The schemes differ significantly in complexity and risk of detection, two 
factors that other researchers believe might be key in the analysis of noncompliance (see 
for instance Milliron (1985); Forest and Sheffrin (2002) for issues of complexity and 
Fischer  et al. (1992) for a review about research on detection probability). Further, 
implementing a voting pattern does not allow for comparing the entire subject pool in 
both tax schemes, but only for comparing the experimental sessions that voted for each 
tax scheme at least once, what might result in a self-selection of data points.   
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3.  Experimental Design 
3.1  Analytical Background of the Experiment 
3.1.1 Multiple-Stage  Game 
The main difficulty for the theoretical modeling is to set government parameters 
such that we can directly compare noncompliance choices in the income tax decision 
and consumption tax decision. Our solution is to construct an experimental setup in 
which the compliance behavior of rational individuals should be indifferent between the 
two tax schemes, unless there is a nonconstant omitted factor, for example a behavioral 
influence, between the two tax payment decisions. To predict individuals’ behavior in 
these settings, we must derive the following determinants of behavior: 
1.  The effect of the compliance decision in either the income tax or the 
consumption tax scheme on an individual’s expected revenue.  
2.  The effect of changes in tax rates for either of the two types of tax framings on 
individual behavior.  
3.  The effect of changes in enforcement effort for either of the two types of tax 
framings on individual behavior. 
We design our experiment as a public-goods game in which individuals pay for a 
public good by the means of taxation with the possibility of evasion. At no point do we 
attempt to find the optimal solution of this model, because we are only interested in the 
relative comparison of tax schemes. 
For the theoretical model we set up a multiple-stage game with a sequence 
similar to the model of Richter and Boadway (2005): 
 
Stage 1; Government policies: The government sets tax and detection rates. In 
the course of the experiment, we alter tax rates and detection rates for both income and 
consumption taxes separately. 
 
Stage 2; Decision on income tax reporting: The individual takes tax and 
detection rates as given, and chooses the income to report for income taxation. Income 
taxes are then deducted based on the reported income. The amount of the reported 
income left after income taxes are levied and the income not reported for income 
taxation are available for consumption. We do not allow for changes in labor supply, 
wages and abilities of the individuals, but we do assign a random income from a known 
distribution to each individual to illustrate different income levels. 
 
Stage 3; Household budget allocation: The individual may choose the part of 
the household budget (disposable income after income taxes) to spend on two private 
goods, A and B. If the individual decides to purchase good A, a consumption tax will be 
levied, if the individual decides to purchase good B there will be no consumption tax. 
 
After the compliance decisions in stage 2 and stage 3 the government conducts 
random audits for both payments with a priori known detection rates. Penalties will  
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arise from these audits if an individual is found to be noncompliant in either of the two 
stages. Taxes, but not penalties, are then used to finance a public good which benefits all 
individuals in equal shares. 
Using a multiple-stage game instead of comparing multiple one-stage games has 
numerous advantages: First, playing both different tax schemes in each treatment 
enables us not only to observe individuals’ reaction in the stage in which we alter 
parameters, but also to control for the reaction in the stage in which we do not alter 
parameters. Second, using a multiple-stage game allows us to control for errors caused 
by certain omitted variables, such as fatigue or excitement, because both tax schemes are 
played in turns. Thus, any change in the experimental environment that we do not 
model explicitly should be equally present in the income and consumption tax scheme. 
Finally, a multiple-stage game allows us to control for signaling and reputation building 
with respect to compliance in a particular tax payment scheme: When contributing to 
the public good, an individual sends two interacted signals. The first is the level of 
overall compliance and the second is the level of income earned. Even though in a 
public-goods game we cannot prevent inferences about overall compliance of other 
group members completely, using a multiple-stage game allows us to prevent inferences 
about the compliance in each separate stage when the public good is financed by the 
total amount of taxes paid. We diminish the chance of robust inferences about the 
overall level of compliance further by assigning income at random to each individual. 
Ensuring that signaling and reputation building is negligible, and thereby ensuring that 
the relevant decisions between subjects are independent, is necessary if we are to apply 
powerful statistical tests of inference.  
Throughout the remainder of the paper we use the tilde (~) to indicate 
stochastic variables. Subscripts I and C shall indicate a variable regarding the income or 
consumption tax scheme, respectively. At the beginning of stage 2, we assign a 
stochastic income to each individual: 
 
) , ( ~
~
β α U YI           [ 1 ]  
 
Gross income from labor ỸI thus is uniformly distributed with lower and upper 
bounds  α and β, respectively. Income taxes are then levied based on the declared 
income as shown in equation (2): 
 
) 1 (
~ ~
I I I C r Y Y τ − =          [ 2 ]  
 
The variable rI is the fraction of gross income ỸI reported to the income tax 
authorities, therefore it denotes the compliance rate in the income tax scheme. τI is the 
linear income tax rate. We note that a linear income tax simplifies the model 
significantly, but does so without any loss of generalization. 
The individual then may choose in stage 3 to apportion the household budget 
ỸC between two private goods. Good A carries a consumption tax and good B is free of 
any tax. We denote the fractions of ỸC spent in gross value of the taxed good A as rC. 
Hence, in analogy to the income tax stage, rC represents the compliance rate in stage 3. 
We denote net value of the goods as vA
net and vB
net, respectively. With τC we denote the 
proportional consumption tax rate:  
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We do not allow for saving, as a result household budget not spent in good A 
must be spent in good B. Equations (3) and (4) therefore show that consuming an equal 
fraction of household budget in the gross value of good A, yields less net value than 
consumption in good B. We assume that to the individual, the benefit from consuming 
the net value of the private goods is equal for the two goods. We think of goods A 
and  B, as the same consumption bundle, one that is produced solely in the legal 
economy (good A) and one that is produced solely in the illegal economy, and therefore, 
not burdened with a consumption tax (good B). We thus avoid any distortional effects 
caused by a change in consumption tax, which may lead to the purchase of a different 
consumption bundle.1 This approach allows us to isolate the noncompliance decision. 
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        [ 5 ]  
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λA,B denotes the multiplier that represents the value of the private goods A and B 
to each individual. Hence, λA,B introduces consumer surplus into the reward function, 
and it is reasonable to assume λA,B > 1. Diminishing marginal utility is generally not a 
problem if the reward is solely monetary and if we can assume that, ceteris paribus, all 
individuals would prefer more money to less money (monotonicity or nonsatiation).2  
We note that we could alternatively set interest rates at zero percent, which would make 
consumption the dominant decision, but doing so does not influence the outcomes of 
the model. 
The public good is modeled as a group fund to which each individual can 
contribute PI from the gross income in the income tax stage and PC from the household 
budget in the consumption tax stage, respectively. 
 
  + = C I P P P
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[7]  
Thus, the payment into the group fund depends on compliance rates, tax rates, 
and income in both stages. We do now need to consider, which expected revenue 
function E(R) the individual faces in each stage. When deciding about income tax 
compliance in stage 2 the individual faces the following expected revenue: 
 
                                                 
1 For some discussion about the strength of this assumption, see Gordon (1989). 
2 For discussion of induced values in experiments refer to Smith (1976) or Wartick et al. (1999).  
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Superscripts k and j denote variables unique to the individual k and j, 
respectively. We explicitly model the rational behavior of individual k and assume that 
all other individuals j face the exact same expected revenue functions.  
We multiply all payments into the group fund by a public goods multiplier 
λP > 1, indicating the social welfare created by the public good. The public good then is 
divided in equal shares among the N individuals in the group. We denote the probability 
of detection of tax evasion set by the local authorities in the income tax scheme as δI 
and the penalty rate when audited and found noncompliant as ρI. The first term in 
brackets in equation (8) is the expected revenue that results from the income that 
remains after income taxes, and the second term is the expected value of a penalty. We 
note that equation (8) assumes that the household budget after income taxes will be fully 
consumed in the net value of the private goods. Hence, in stage 2, we model the income 
tax phase as if there is no consumption tax phase in which noncompliance could occur. 
The sum in equation (8) is the payment from the public good that depends on the 
decisions of individual k and all other individuals j ∀ j ≠ k. 
In stage  3, where the individual chooses between good  A from which 
consumption taxes will be levied and the untaxed good  B, the individual faces the 
expected revenue function: 
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In equation (9), we again model consumer surplus by the private goods 
multiplier λA,B on the net value of good A or good B, respectively. The parameters δC 
and ρC denote the probability of detection and the penalty rate with respect to the 
noncompliance rate rC in the consumption tax stage. In analogy to the income tax stage, 
the penalty is paid based on the household budget that is not consumed in the taxed 
private good A. 
We have now set up the theoretical model that we use to make predictions 
about the issues outlined above, in which we assume a risk neutral individual who 
maximizes expected value. We recall that we do not intend to find the optimal solution 
to the problem stated above, because we may have omitted relevant nonmonetary 
variables, such as conditional cooperation, as discussed, for instance, by Fischbacher et 
al. (2001) and Frey and Torgler (2007), or matters of fairness, as proposed, for instance, 
by Rabin (1993). However, if we can assume that these omitted variables are not 
different between the income tax scheme and the consumption tax scheme, then 
comparing compliance decisions between those schemes rather than solving for the 
optimum will difference out all constant omitted variables.  
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3.1.2  Rational Behavior in the Income and Consumption Tax Frame 
When contributing to the public good in either the income tax stage or the 
consumption tax stage, a rational taxpayer should only be concerned about the effects 
on the individual expected revenue. For our analysis, we compare the two tax schemes 
to make predictions about compliance levels. If we take for granted that the individual 
demands an equal rate of return in both framings of the tax payment decision, we must 
analyze partial derivatives of the standardized expected revenues. In the income tax 
stage, we use equation (8) to derive: 
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For the consumption tax stage, from equation (9) we derive: 
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If the omitted variables are constant between both tax schemes, then the 
following must hold: 
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Equation (12) implicitly assumes that compliance does not depend on 
parameters of the distribution for the random variables ỸI and ỸC, particularly the mean 
value. If we set δI = δC and ρI = ρC, then risk of detection and the penalties the 
individual will face if detected are exactly the same in both tax schemes, relative to ỸI 
and ỸC. We set τI = τC/(1 + τC). Thus, the effective tax burden is the same in both 
stages. Equation (12) then yields: 
 
k
C
k
I r r =           [ 1 3 ]  
 
Thus, if a rational individual is concerned solely about his or her individual 
revenue and not about the framing of the tax-paying decision, particularly if there is no 
systematic dislike for either of the two tax schemes, then we must find rI
k = rC
k on 
average.   
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3.1.3  Reaction to a Change in Tax Rates 
We are further interested in the effect of a change in tax rates on the revenue of 
individual k. With all other factors constant, an implicit differentiation of equation (8) 
yields: 
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For a comparable change in tax burden in the consumption tax stage, an implicit 
differentiation of equation (9) gives: 
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If we again set τI = τC/(1 + τC), δI = δC, and ρI = ρC as a starting point, the terms 
in brackets in equations (14) and (15) are equal. Thus, the compliance elasticities of taxes 
for a comparable change in tax rate are equal for the income and consumption tax-
payment decisions. 
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If we ensure that a change in the tax burden is the same in the income and 
consumption tax payment decision, it follows from equation (16): 
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The intuition behind the equality of the elasticities is that regardless of the 
starting values rI
k and rC
k in our experimental environment, the relative reaction in 
compliance should not be different when we alter the tax burden in either the income 
tax or the consumption tax stage by the same amount.  
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3.1.4  Reaction to a Change in Detection Probability 
Here, we consider the effect of a change in detection probability on the expected 
revenue, and therefore on the compliance decision of the individual. We decide to alter 
detection probabilities instead of penalty rates. An equivalent change in penalty rates 
would have the exact same effect on the expected revenue.3 Again, we use implicit 
differentiation to derive from equations (8) and (9): 
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In analogy to equations (14) and (15), with τI = τC/(1 + τC), δI = δC, and ρI = ρC 
as starting points, the terms in brackets are equivalent in equations (18) and (19). Thus, 
we compute the elasticities: 
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Consistent with the argument developed in the previous section, when we alter 
detection probabilities for the exact same amount in both stages, it must hold: 
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Again, regardless of the starting values rI
k and rC
k, a rational taxpayer should not 
react differently to an equal change in detection probabilities in either of the two 
schemes. 
3.2 Hypotheses  Development 
We have taken great care to ensure that monetary variables are modeled 
explicitly and that constant omitted variables are treated exactly alike in both tax stages 
of our model. Therefore, differences between the two payment schemes should not be 
expected. However, as is known from other areas of behavioral research, individuals are 
strongly influenced by the way a problem is presented. Given our previous rationale 
about influences of framing in behavioral public finance, we ultimately conjecture that 
subjects will not behave as predicted by the purely monetary theoretical model even 
                                                 
3 For some experimental evidence on differences between altering detection probability and penalty rates, 
see Alm et al. (1992) and Hessing et al. (1992).  
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though effective tax burden, penalty rates, detection probability, and public goods 
multiplier are exactly the same in both tax schemes. Since previous research is, to our 
knowledge, not available on the subject at hand, we cannot draw on earlier results. 
Theoretically, if we find a significant deviation from the predictions made by our 
theoretical model, we can conclude that there is a nonconstant omitted variable which 
we have not incorporated, but which should be considered by policy makers. Given the 
fundamental objective of our analysis, we do not thrive to investigate the cause for 
differences between the two tax schemes. However, in order to increase robustness of 
our findings and to increase understanding of potential differences, we also include 
additional analyses. We first ask, whether a change in effective tax burden, which would 
influence relative weight between the two schemes, has different effects in the tax 
schemes. Second, we compare the effects when detection probability is altered. Our 
overall hypothesis is that individuals do not behave in the way predicted by the 
theoretical model in section 3.1.  
We first analyze if we are able to find evidence for differences in the general 
level of compliance between the two tax payment framings when tax burden and 
detection rates are equal in both schemes. A behavioral factor would be indicated in this 
case if compliance rates rI and rC were different. Therefore, we conjecture: 
 
H1: With equal tax burden and enforcement, compliance rates are significantly different when 
we frame the compliance decision as an income declaration decision or a consumption decision. 
 
Our model also predicts that a change in the income tax rate τI should have the 
exact same effect on individual compliance as would an identical change in the term 
τC/(1 + τC). Equation (17) shows that compliance elasticities for comparable tax rate 
changes are equal. Thus, framing would affect compliance if we observe: 
 
H2: Individuals’ reactions to a change in tax burden in the income tax are significantly 
different from the reaction to a comparable change in consumption tax. 
 
Using the elasticities allows us to analyze H2 independent of the findings in H1. 
Thus, even if we find different compliance rates at equal tax burden in H1, we might 
find an additional behavioral interaction factor if adjustment towards a change in tax 
rates were different. A change in tax rates in either of the tax schemes shifts relative 
weight of the respective tax in the multiple-stage game, thus allows us to draw 
inferences about the behavioral effects of the relative importance of the two tax 
schemes in the overall tax system.  
We can use a similar line of argument with respect to equation (21), when we 
alter detection probabilities in the income or the consumption tax scheme. Again, we 
might find an additional nonconstant omitted variable, if we were able to find different 
elasticities of compliance for a change in detection probabilities.  
 
H3: Individuals’ reactions to a change in detection probabilities in the income tax are 
significantly different from the reaction to a comparable change in consumption tax. 
 
Again, since we use elasticities, we already control for any findings that might 
occur in H1.  
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3.3  Experimental Design Details 
To differentiate between the theoretical model and the question of framing in 
the experimental setup, we label the tax compliance decision in the income tax scheme 
as phase1, and the decision in the consumption tax scheme as phase2. After phase2, 
each individual is informed about audits in phase1 and phase2, and penalties are 
deducted from the overall revenue. The random gross income at the beginning of each 
round is uniformly distributed with α = 1000 and β = 1600: 
 
) 1600 , 1000 ( ~
~
U YI          [ 2 2 ]  
 
After income is randomly assigned, phase1 and phase2 contain the exact same 
decision, especially the decision on what proportion of ỸI or ỸC, respectively, to enter, 
on which contributions to the public good will be based. The only difference is that we 
frame the decision in phase1 as declaring income, and the decision in phase2 as buying 
goods. Further, we must present tax rates with different numerical values, even when 
the rates imply the exact same effective burden, since income tax and consumption tax 
are calculated differently. Audits were conducted after each phase but results are 
revealed only after both phases are completed to ensure that penalty payments do not 
affect decisions during a round. Subjects were informed about their results at the end of 
each round.  
We designed the instructions4 and the experimental tool with great care to 
ensure that they included only tax neutral terminology, and that the decision screens in 
which the decisions had to be entered were identical for both phases. Subjects were 
provided with an onscreen calculator to circumvent errors caused by miscalculations. To 
avoid end-game effects, we informed the subjects that each treatment would run for at 
least ten rounds and that further rounds would be played based on the results of a 
random draw. The probability of another round (the end of treatment) was set at 
70 percent (30 percent). 
Most of the parameters in the model above were kept constant throughout all 
treatments. The parameter values were available to the subjects at all times on their 
written instructions. Table 1 shows the constant parameters: 
 
Table 1: Parameters Held Constant Between Treatments 
Parameter Value 
λP  2.0 
λA,B  1.1 
ρI  1.1 
ρC  1.1 
λP is the group fund multiplier, λA,B is the multiplier for the value of the private goods A and B, ρI and ρC are the penalty 
rates for the income and consumption tax scheme, respectively. 
 
Setting λP = 2.0 and λA,B  = 1.1 makes it mutually beneficial to contribute the 
maximum amount to the group fund (thus, a social planner would want to make sure 
that this is the case). We use the argument of a social planner to justify the introduction 
                                                 
4 A copy of the instructions can be made available by the authors upon request.  
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of an audit into the system. Doing so allows us to avoid loaded terminology (Wartick et 
al. (1999)) and also to emphasize the importance of the public good to the subjects. The 
chosen parameters further yield ∂E(RI
k)/∂rI
k
 < 0 and ∂E(RC
k)/∂rC
k < 0, hence from a 
game theory perspective, it would be individually beneficial to pay no taxes at all.  
A significant incentive to comply with the public-goods provision was created by 
setting a penalty rate of ρI = ρC  =  1.1 on the amount of money not declared/not 
consumed in good A. We note that a factor of 1.1 means that all income not reported 
will be seized and that there will be an additional fine of ten percent on this amount. 
Hence, penalties were significant compared to the taxes that would have been paid if the 
amount was rightfully declared in phase1 or consumed in goods of the legal economy in 
phase2. 
 
Table 2: Parameters Altered Between Treatments 
Parameters  Treatment 
τI  τC  δI  δC 
T1: base case  20.00 % 25.00 % 10.00 %  10.00 %
T2: high income tax rate  33.33 % 25.00 % 10.00 %  10.00 %
T3: high consumption tax rate  20.00 % 50.00 % 10.00 %  10.00 %
T4: high income detection probability  20.00 % 25.00 % 20.00 %  10.00 %
T5: high consumption detection probability  20.00 % 25.00 % 10.00 %  20.00 %
τI and τC are the tax rates; δI and δC are the detection rates for the income and consumption tax scheme, respectively. 
 
We basically use a 4-factor 2×2×2×2 (income tax rate, consumption tax rate, 
income tax detection probability, and consumption tax detection probability) within-
subject design, but omit all the interaction effects in which we are not particularly 
interested. Table  2 shows that subjects face a higher numerical value for the 
consumption tax rate than for the income tax rate. However, since we compute the 
income tax payment based on the gross income, but compute the consumption tax 
payment based on the net value of the good, the burden from income (20 percent) and 
consumption (25 percent) tax in T1 is effectively equal. The effective income tax burden 
in T2 (33  percent) is also equal to the effective consumption tax burden in T3 
(50 percent). Further, the probability of detection is equal in the income tax of T4 and 
in the consumption tax of T5. 
Since all treatments incorporate a significant amount of both types of taxes, 
there is little difference in the complexity of the overall tax system between treatments 
that might disturb comparative analysis. All treatments were played in each experimental 
session in a random sequence. To capture learning effects at the beginning of sessions, 
subjects played several trial rounds directly after the instructor read the instructions 
aloud while subjects read along. The parameters of the trial rounds corresponded to the 
parameters of the first treatment in the particular session. 
To increase robustness of our results, we further asked the subjects to complete 
a short questionnaire at the end of each treatment with the intention to elicit subjective 
perceptions. We first asked the subjects about their perception of tax burden in the 
income tax and the consumption tax framing. We called these multiple-choice variables 
PERC_INC and PERC_CON, with a minimum value of one and a maximum value of 
six, where a high value indicates a high perceived tax burden. We further elicited an 
indirect measure of the perceived tax burden, namely, asking for the minimum group  
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fund multiplier λPmin at which subjects would be willing to comply fully in each phase. 
The variables MULT_INC and MULT_CON indicate the values for phase1 and phase2, 
respectively. We note that for λPmin = 4 · λA,B, full compliance dominates all other 
alternatives, regardless of any other group member’s decisions, tax rates, and detection 
probabilities. For the differences between PERC_INC and PERC_CON as well as 
MULT_INC and MULT_CON we expect similar results as for rI and rC.  
We used N = 8 subjects in each of ten computer-based experimental sessions. 
Each subject drew a random number from a bingo cage prior to the start of the session. 
We assured subjects that their decisions could only be tracked by the system based on 
their subject number, which was not known to the experimenters at any time. To 
provide a maximum amount of anonymity, even within their peers, subjects were then 
randomly assigned to two groups of four subjects each. Subjects had no information 
about group composition at any time. Both groups had an own group fund, so the two 
groups played completely independent from one another. Further, anew random 
assignment of groups at the beginning of each treatment allowed us to analyze 
treatments independently from one another. The undergraduate and graduate student 
subjects (average age: 23.35 years; average number of semesters: 6.2) had previously 
registered on a website that is regularly used for recruiting subjects to economic 
experiments. About two weeks prior to the experimental sessions, 598 potential subjects 
received an email informing them about the experiments and asking them to register for 
the experiments online. Subjects were then automatically scheduled to sessions at their 
own convenience at a first come, first served basis. Sessions lasted approximately 1.5 
hours and the 80 subjects received an average pay of € 19.32. 
4.  Data Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive  Statistics 
The experimental sessions yield data on the subject level for 4,880 rounds. We 
analyze the average treatment level data per individual to avoid any problems that might 
be caused by different numbers of rounds in a treatment, and also to increase the 
robustness of our statistical results. We use nonparametric statistical methods to avoid 
assumptions about our experimental data (e.g., normally distributed variables). However, 
we find that using parametric statistical tests where they are feasible produces similar 
results. To distinguish between the variables in the theoretical section of this paper and 
the realizations of the variable, in the remainder of the paper we denote realizations with 
a preceding “_”. When we discuss a specific value of a variable in a certain treatment, 
we indicate the treatment name at the beginning of the variable name. 
Table 3 shows the average compliance rates for all treatments in the income tax 
(phase1 with variable _rI) and consumption tax (phase2 with variable _rC).  As a test for 
robustness of results, we further utilize the answers given in the after treatment 
questionnaires. Those variables provide support for the experimental results if a 
relatively low (high) average compliance rate _rI and _rC correlates with a high (low) 
perception of tax burden (_PERC_INC and _PERC_CON). Further, a relatively low 
(high) average compliance rate should correlate with a high (low) minimum multiplier 
for the group fund (_MULT_INC and _MULT_CON), at which point subjects would 
be willing to comply fully.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment and Questionnaire Variables 
Quartiles  Variable 
25 %  50 %  75 % 
Mean STD 
Experiment        
T1_rI  0.350  0.682  0.851  0.604  0.301 
T1_rC    0.322 0.580 0.799 0.560  0.292 
T2_rI  0.206  0.583  0.811  0.524  0.329 
T2_rC    0.300 0.624 0.831 0.573  0.320 
T3_rI  0.369  0.745  0.911  0.630  0.334 
T3_rC    0.194 0.478 0.768 0.473  0.332 
T4_rI  0.695  0.911  1.000  0.803  0.243 
T4_rC    0.247 0.565 0.754 0.519  0.315 
T5_rI  0.319  0.656  0.897  0.576  0.346 
T5_rC    0.633 0.855 0.974 0.780  0.243 
Questionnaire        
T1_PERC_INC  2.000  3.000  3.000  2.900  1.109 
T1_PERC_CON  2.000 3.000 4.000 3.150  1.223 
T1_MULT_INC  3.000  3.000  4.000  4.043  4.231 
T1_MULT_CON  3.000 3.000 4.000 4.099  4.147 
T2_PERC_INC  3.000  4.000  5.000  3.638  1.343 
T2_PERC_CON  2.000 3.000 4.000 3.012  1.049 
T2_MULT_INC  3.000  4.000  4.000  4.856  6.641 
T2_MULT_CON  2.500 3.000 4.000 4.412  6.556 
T3_PERC_INC  2.000  2.000  3.000  2.362  1.046 
T3_PERC_CON  3.000 5.000 6.000 4.375  1.578 
T3_MULT_INC  2.000  3.000  4.000  3.849  4.259 
T3_MULT_CON  3.000 3.500 5.000 4.401  4.153 
T4_PERC_INC  2.000  3.000  3.000  2.725  0.954 
T4_PERC_CON  2.000 3.000 3.750 2.950  1.101 
T4_MULT_INC  2.000  3.000  4.000  3.657  4.085 
T4_MULT_CON  3.000 3.000 4.000 4.027  4.003 
T5_PERC_INC  2.000  3.000  3.000  2.712  1.058 
T5_PERC_CON  2.000 3.000 3.000 2.812  1.068 
T5_MULT_INC  3.000  3.000  4.000  3.954  4.059 
T5_MULT_CON  2.000 3.000 4.000 3.616  4.119 
One subject, who reported 9,999,999 as _MULT_INC and _MULT_CON in all treatments, was excluded for all 
analyses using those variables.  
Preceding labels T1 – T5 indicate the treatment in which variables have been measured. The variables ri and rc are the 
compliance rates in phase1 and phase2, respectively. _PERC indicates perceived tax burden, _MULT indicates the 
minimum multiplier at which subjects would have been willing to comply fully. _INC and _CON indicate variables for 
phase1 and phase2, respectively. 
 
One of the underlying assumptions for the statistical inference tests is that the 
decision of a particular subject in phase1 (_rI) and phase2 (_rC) does not depend on the 
decisions of the other subjects. As discussed above, we deliberately designed the 
experiment to avoid the effect of possible communication via signaling. Therefore, our 
main concern in this area is that the possible communication about individuals’ overall 
level of compliance between subjects might have an effect on the particular  
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_rI/_rC-combination. Since communication is only possible in case of complete 
noncompliance, the independence assumption would be reasonable if the ratio between 
_rI and _rC does not change when the overall level of compliance changes. The data 
support our assumption. A comparative analysis of _rI/_rC-combinations chosen by 
subjects whose overall compliance was lower than the 25
th percentile and subjects 
whose overall compliance was higher than the 75
th percentile yields no significant 
differences (p = 0.836, Mann-Whitney-U, two-tailed).  
For the questionnaire variables, all of the median values of the _MULT_INC 
and _MULT_CON are significantly lower than 4.4, the group fund multiplier at which 
full compliance would dominate in both phases over all other alternatives (all at the 
1  percent-level, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two tailed). Thus, we find evidence that 
subjects had a good understanding of the interaction between the two private goods and 
the public good. We further conclude that subjects would fully comply in treatments 
when there was a group fund multiplier lower than the absolute dominance multiplier. 
This result indicates that detection probabilities and penalty rates are significant enough 
to deter full noncompliance. 
We further utilize elasticities in our theoretical model to predict subjects’ 
behavior when tax rates and detection probabilities are altered. We calculate estimates 
for the elasticities from the experimentally observed changes in compliance rates when 
we alter tax burden and detection probabilities, respectively. We compute the values for 
equations (16) and (20) between values in T1 and the respective values in the other 
treatments that are relevant for our analysis. We note that we compute the values for the 
perception of tax burden (_PERC) and the minimum multiplier, at which subjects 
would comply fully (_MULT), similar to the way in which we computed those in 
equations (16) and (20). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Elasticity Estimates 
Quartiles  Variable 
25 %  50 %  75 % 
Mean STD 
Increasing Tax Burden (H2)         
T1T2_ELAST_rI  -0.672  -0.097  0.126  -0.131  0.941 
T1T3_ELAST_rC  -0.835 -0.141 0.250  -0.088  1.233 
T1T2_ELAST_PERC_INC  0.000  0.375  1.375  0.612  1.071 
T1T3_ELAST_PERC_CON  0.000 0.750 1.500 0.922  1.389 
T1T2_ELAST_MULT_INC  0.000  0.000  0.500  0.327  1.576 
T1T3_ELAST_MULT_CON  0.000 0.000 0.500 0.239  0.827 
Increasing Detection Probability (H3)         
T1T4_ELAST_rI  0.090  0.436  1.210  1.584  3.790 
T1T5_ELAST_rC  0.052 0.869 2.301 1.861  4.100 
T1T4_ELAST_PERC_INC  -0.500  0.000  0.000  0.115  1.096 
T1T5_ELAST_PERC_CON  -0.667  0.000 0.000 -0.025  0.913 
T1T4_ELAST_MULT_INC  -0.609  -0.286  0.000  -0.126  0.717 
T1T5_ELAST_MULT_CON -0.571 -0.333 0.000  -0.240  0.496 
Preceding labels T1 – T5 indicate the treatments between which elasticities are computed. The variables _rI and _rC are the 
compliance rates in phase1 and phase2, respectively. _PERC indicates perceived tax burden, _MULT indicates the 
minimum multiplier at which subjects would have been willing to comply fully. _INC and _CON indicate variables for 
phase1 and phase2, respectively.  
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When looking at Table 4, we note that the elasticity with respect to tax burden 
(H2) seems to be higher for the variable _PERC than for the variable _MULT. 
Differences are highly significant (p  =  0.000  for income tax and p  =  0.001 for 
consumption tax, Wilcoxon, two-tailed). For the elasticity with respect to detection 
probability (H3), this effect is exactly opposite, but the differences are nonsignificant 
(p = 0.139 for income tax and p = 0.152 for consumption tax, Wilcoxon, two-tailed). 
Both observations are reasonable, since a change in tax rate should have a stronger 
effect on the perceived tax burden than on the minimum multiplier at which full 
compliance would occur, and vice versa for a change in detection probabilities. These 
results serve as further evidence that subjects understood the interaction between 
variables in the experiment, and support the credibility of subjects’ reactions towards a 
change in the experimental environment. 
We note that the main assumption of the elasticity measure is that changes are 
incremental. However, if it is true that the real relationship between change in 
compliance (and questionnaire variables) towards changes in tax burden and detection 
probabilities, respectively, is the same for income and consumption taxes, we should not 
find differences.  
4.2 Results 
Table 5 shows the comparative results of the variables that are either measured 
in the experiment or obtained through the questionnaire.  
 
Table 5: Comparative Results Between the Two Tax Payment Framings 
Wilcoxon 
Income Tax Variable  Consumption Tax Variable  ∆ Sum of 
Ranks  p-value 
Direct Comparison (H1)       
T1_rI  T1_rC  +  0.014** 
T1_PERC_INC T1_PERC_CON  -  0.042** 
T1_MULT_INC  T1_MULT_CON  -  0.390 
Increasing Tax Burden (H2)     
T1T2_ELAST_rI  T1T3_ELAST_rC  +  0.883 
T1T2_ELAST_PERC_INC T1T3_ELAST_PERC_CON  -  0.071* 
T1T2_ELAST_MULT_INC  T1T3_ELAST_MULT_CON  -  0.877 
Increasing Detection Probability (H3)     
T1T4_ELAST_rI  T1T5_ELAST_rC  -  0.021** 
T1T4_ELAST_PERC_INC T1T5_ELAST_PERC_CON  +  0.453 
T1T4_ELAST_MULT_INC  T1T5_ELAST_MULT_CON  +  0.105 
The Wilcoxon-Test is based on the general form: income tax variable – consumption tax variable. For ∆ Sum of Ranks a 
“+” indicates a higher absolute value of positive sum of ranks and “-“ indicates a higher absolute value of negative sum of 
ranks. Thus “+” (“-“) indicates a higher (lower) income tax variable compared to the corresponding consumption tax variable. 
*, **, and *** highlight significant differences at level 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, the Wilcoxon-Test is carried out two-tailed. 
 
Since our main goal is to analyze the comparative results between the different 
tax payment decisions, we investigate whether subjects’ compliance behavior is different 
between the income reporting framing and the consumption framing, respectively (H1).  
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Therefore, we compare experimentally observed compliance rates T1_rI and T1_rC. 
Table 3 shows that the observed compliance rates differ by 10.2 percentage points in the 
median, and Table 5 yields evidence that these differences are significant (p = 0.014). 
This finding supports H1. Those results further are strongly supported by significant 
differences between T1_PERC_INC and T1_PERC_CON (p = 0.042). Differences in 
the desired multiplier for full compliance point in the expected direction, but are 
nonsignificant (T1_MULT_INC < T1_MULT_CON, p = 0.390).  
 
Table 6: Spearman Correlations for Variables in Treatment 1 (T1) 
Income Tax Framing (phase1)   
 T1_PERC_INC  T1_MULT_INC 
T1_rI  -0.375***  -0.342*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
T1_MULT_INC -0.034  -- 
 (0.767)  -- 
Consumption Tax Framing (phase2)   
 T1_PERC_CON  T1_MULT_CON 
T1_rC  -0.163  -0.282** 
  (0.148)  (0.012) 
T1_MULT_CON 0.094  -- 
 (0.410)  -- 
Two-tailed p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** highlight significance at level 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. 
 
Because H1 is the main hypothesis of this paper, in Table 6 we also analyze the 
correlation between the relevant variables. All correlations point in the same direction, 
as we expected from the findings in Table 5 and significance of correlation between the 
variables indicates the robustness of the reported findings.  
We are further interested in the analysis of differences in elasticities when we 
alter the effective tax burden (H2). The absolute median value of the tax burden 
elasticities of compliance is higher in the consumption tax phase than in the income tax 
phase but differences are nonsignificant (p  =  0.883). The findings from the 
questionnaire variables _PERC and _MULT both point in the same direction as the 
experimentally observed compliance rates. However, the differences are only marginally 
significant for the perception of tax burden (p  =  0.071) and nonsignificant for the 
minimum multiplier at which subjects would comply fully (p = 0.877). 
We next consider whether we find differences in elasticities when detection 
probabilities are increased (H3). To draw our conclusions, we compare the detection 
probability elasticities of compliance from Table 5. We generally find positive elasticities 
in our data. Experimentally observed elasticities of compliance rates are higher in the 
consumption tax phase than in the income tax phase and the differences are significant 
(p = 0.021). The differences in the questionnaire variables _PERC and _MULT both 
point in the direction that supports the findings in experimentally observed compliance 
rates, but both differences are nonsignificant (p = 0.453 for _PERC and p = 0.105 for 
_MULT).   
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4.3 Discussion 
Our analysis of the compliance rates and questionnaire responses in T1 indicates 
strong support for H1, which posits that compliance is significantly different between 
the consumption tax phase and the income tax phase. In T1, effective tax burden and 
detection rates are equivalent, and all constant omitted variables difference out. 
Therefore our results indicate a strong effect of framing on tax compliance. When 
looking at the questionnaire variables we find that subjects’ perceived tax burden is 
higher in the consumption tax scheme, which could be one determinant explaining the 
differences in compliance.  
For H2 we note that in experimental noncompliance research it is well 
established that compliance decreases when tax rates increase, as can be seen, for 
instance, in the literature reviews from Jackson and Milliron (1986) or Alm (1991). Thus, 
the negative elasticities for the reaction in _rI and _rC are what previous research 
indicated. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that elasticities are equal in 
both phases. We have in consequence not been able to identify an additional behavioral 
factor that indicates individuals’ reactions toward a comparable change in tax rates (H2). 
Results therefore indicate that the relative importance of direct and indirect taxation in 
the overall tax system does not have an influence on compliance.  
From previous experimental research, we would then expect a positive elasticity 
of compliance when detection probability is increased, as can, for instance, be found in 
Fischer et al. (1992) and is also found in our analysis. For H3, we find evidence that 
individuals react stronger when enforcement efforts are increased in the consumption 
tax than in the income tax. However, this evidence is not as robust as the findings from 
H1, since it cannot be found in two of the three relevant variables. 
As with any applied research, our approach has some caveats concerning 
internal and external validity which we need to draw attention to. Internal validity refers 
to the ability of the experiment to identify the main variables that influence the 
outcome. To allow for clear-cut predictions of individual behavior of a rational taxpayer, 
our theoretical model must rely on assumptions: First, the experimental design permits 
two decisions in two different phases. The sequence of those phases is fixed, i.e., the 
income tax payment decision is always prior to the consumption tax payment decision, 
which could lead to unmeasured sequential effects. Hence a possible alternative 
explanation for our findings could be that with several consecutively levied tax 
payments, individuals generally comply more during the earlier tax payment decisions. 
Thus, if we were to switch the sequence of the tax payment decisions, we should then 
expect to see compliance shift more towards the consumption tax scheme. We could 
further consider running recurring tax payment decisions, for instance two or more 
income tax schemes, and might then observe compliance decreasing in the latter stages 
of the multiple-stage game, even though there are no differences in the framing of the 
tax payment decision. In our experimental setup we are not able to control for such a 
case. However, the sequence we choose for our experiment seems to be the most 
realistic representation of tax systems around the world. Many other theoretical models 
either explicitly or implicitly rely on the same assumption, such as those of Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976), Atkinson and Stern (1980), Hines (2004), and Richter and Boadway 
(2005). Second, our theoretical model relies strongly on the assumptions that the 
individual will regard the decisions in the two tax schemes as independent, as it is 
conjectured in equations (8) and (9), and further, that the individual decides based solely 
on the expected value of the monetary variables, given that all omitted variables are  
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constant. We can neither verify nor falsify these assumptions and thus they remain 
weaknesses of the investigation. Future research should investigate whether omitted 
variables can be identified that can explain the behavior observed in our experiments.  
External validity of our experiment could be reduced by the utilization of 
students as subjects. Students might have different attitudes or real world perceptions 
towards noncompliance than would other subjects outside the academic world. Further, 
due to low income of students and therefore low income taxes, consumption taxes have 
a stronger impact on students’ after tax budget and, for the same reason, students might 
also be more familiar with consumption tax noncompliance situations. However, 53 of 
the 80 subjects were in the second half of their studies and 46 had handed in at least one 
income tax return. Thus, we conclude that numerous subjects have experience outside 
academia. Further, it does not seem feasible to believe that the cognitive processes of 
students regarding tax noncompliance are significantly different from those of non-
students when tax neutral terminology is used, as the research by Wartick et al. (1999) 
indicates. In fact, using student subjects allows us to take advantage of the presumably 
low income outside the laboratory, so in the experimental environment, monetary 
incentives are more likely to induce necessary reward dominance. A further external 
validity aspect is that we do not account for the different costs of audits, which certainly 
should be a decision variable for a policy maker. Also, external validity is limited by the 
fact that the opportunity to evade taxes might be different for both tax schemes, for 
instance that the consumption tax scheme needs a black market seller of goods to be 
able to evade at all. Finally, it must generally be noted that experimental research can 
hardly incorporate all factors that might affect tax compliance behavior. In our 
experimental design, omitted factors could include the notion of fairness, fear of social 
proscription, fear of imprisonment or even physical punishment, subjective perception 
about the spending of taxes, acceptance of a nation’s political system, and many others. 
If, on the one hand, it could be assumed that these factors affect direct taxation and 
indirect taxation similarly, then the effects on our comparative analysis regarding 
noncompliance would be negligible. If, on the other hand, it must be suspected that the 
factors which are not incorporated have a different effect on direct taxation and indirect 
taxation, this would in fact yield additional support for our general notion that the 
framing of the tax payment decision has an effect on tax compliance. 
With these caveats in mind, we find different behavioral effects in the data. First, 
we find highly significant differences in compliance rates and perceived tax burden 
between the income tax and consumption tax phase, when effective tax rates are equal 
(H1). This finding is the single most important result of our study. It is strongly 
supported by the data for all treatments. Second, even though we find decreasing 
compliance rates when tax rates are increased, when taxes are altered we do not find 
significant differences in the elasticities of compliance between the income and 
consumption tax scheme (H2). Last, we find marginal support for H3, that subjects 
react differently towards a change in detection probabilities under different framing. 
Overall, we find that nonconstant omitted variables do influence compliance decisions 
in the income and consumption tax scheme differently. Behavioral differences therefore 
should be considered when designing a tax system. 
5.  Conclusion 
In our paper we use data from laboratory experiments to analyze different 
compliance decisions when policy makers structure the tax payment decision either as  
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an income tax or a consumption tax. Our main finding is that individuals are 
significantly less compliant under the consumption tax structure than under the income 
tax structure.  Although we do not find differences in reaction towards a change in tax 
rates, we do find significant differences towards a change in detection probabilities 
between the two framings of the tax payment decision. Individuals seem to react more 
strongly towards a change in enforcement in the consumption than in the income tax 
scheme.  
As is true with any applied work, this data should be viewed with caution. On 
the one hand, though the experiments are carefully designed to capture the essential 
parameters of the real environment (see Plott (1987) for the notion of parallelism), the 
external validity of the results is uncertain. On the other hand, field data are not 
available now, and are very unlikely to become available in the future.  
O v e r a l l ,  w e  d o  f i n d  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  r e a c t  d i f f e r e n t l y  t o  a n  i n c o m e  o r  a  
consumption tax in our experiments, and that those differences are significant. 
Therefore, a policy maker should consider the findings of this paper, bearing in mind 
the caveats of experimental research as a whole and of our experiments in particular. 
Although an indirect consumption tax might increase the employment level and might 
be easier to enforce, those benefits possibly will be outweighed by a higher level of 
noncompliance. Further, decreasing overall tax morale caused by a more consumption-
tax-based system could lead to stronger feelings of inequity in the overall tax system. 
This effect might create a general increase in noncompliance, and also affect the income 
tax compliance in the long run. 
Future research should increase robustness of our findings, either by additional 
experiments or through empirical analysis of archival data. It could also be interesting to 
examine the determinants that lead to the differences in noncompliance between 
different framings of taxation. Social welfare could be increased by levying public 
finances through a tax system in which the perceived tax burden of the overall tax 
system is minimal, all other factors – particularly government revenue – equal.   
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